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The Bush Regime from Elections to Detentions:




To many people in the United States and abroad, the Bush regime
is known primarily for the international mess it has created as the
world's only superpower, and for the way it has sacrificed long-accepted
legal norms-military and civilian, international and domestic-in the
name of its so-called War on Terror.' These violations of legal norms
can be divided into two categories: (1) domestic repression, as exempli-
fied by the PATRIOT Act2 and surveillance projects;3 and (2) the brutal-
ity and denial of legal obligations toward enemy non-Americans at Abu
Gharib and the Guantdnamo detention camps, as well as rejection of the
Torture Conventions4 and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions on
Prisoners of War.5 Most recently, Congress approved the denial of judi-
cial review (through habeas corpus) of the so-called "military tribunals"
for alleged terrorist combatants-tribunals that are empowered to pro-
ceed, after years of legal blackout, without informing defendants of the
evidence against them or allowing them to confront either the evidence
or their accusers.6
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S.
Ct. 3067 (2007); Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct.
3078 (2007); see also Hansje Plagman, The Status of the Right to Life and the Prohibition of
Torture Under International Law: Its Implications for the United States, 2003 J. INST. JUST. &
INT'L STUD. 172 (discussing the United States' failure to follow domestic and international laws in
the War on Terror).
2. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
3. See Rhonda McMillion, Balancing Act: Surveillance Bills Should Account for Individual
Rights, Executive Power, Says ABA, 92 A.B.A. J. 67 (2006); Gil Smart, Fear of Terrorism,
Terrorism of Fear, SUNDAY NEWS (Lancaster, Pa.), Mar. 25, 2007 at 1.
4. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A (2000) (providing for limited implementation of the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10,
1984)).
5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
6. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C.); see also Boumediene, 476 F.3d 981.
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We all hope, even pray, that these changes have not become-and
will not become-hardwired, permanent features of U.S. law at home or
U.S. policy abroad. It is ultimately too early to tell. How will the Iraqi
debacle end? Will that war end with the United States receiving a
bloody nose, retreating from its transient and aberrant form of Empire
back to a more modest position? Will the next administration repair the
damage by winning back allies? relaxing adversaries? settling regional
conflicts, especially in the Middle East, with a more modest
realpolitische approach? and cooling the world temperature (literally
and metaphorically)?
Or are we only at the beginning of a period in which the sole hege-
mon, a reactionary United States run by the rich and religious, embarks
on various ideological crusades to promote its peculiar way of life? Are
we being led into a "clash of civilizations"-one where both sides, all
sides, are marked by aggression and intolerance without end?7 Are there
bases for domestic resistance within the United States? So far, we have
seen very little resistance as the Bush regime has successfully employed
a reckless policy-one that permits no visible economic sacrifices (quite
the opposite) and no levie en masse military draft, while it successfully
deflects mass public attention from its military failures, domestic incom-
petence, and corruption by posturing about and manipulating terrorism
concerns. In the absence of a serious opposition party or organized civil
society, effective opposition may only develop following repeated
defeats in the international arena.
Finally, is "the West," the liberal and social democratic Atlantic
World as we have known it for sixty years, a thing of the past? Is the
pressure of a demographic crisis and an Islamic presence in Europe,
combined with an unanchored America, too much for "the West," as we
know it, to bear? I will return later to the issue of whether "the West" is
now a smokescreen for naked U.S. power, or whether Europe can pro-
vide an embedding of U.S. power as the European Union ("EU") and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") earlier did for Germany.8
Or has the U.S.-supported expansion of the EU and NATO thinned and
undercut an already weak and divided Europe? Should we, as Ameri-
cans, ask our friends and allies abroad then for taming A la Blair or for
your resistance, for multilateralism, or for outright opposition?
The Bush regime's ability to transform the United States, the
7. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF THE WORLD ORDER (1997) (describing the new era in world politics,
modernization, and reactions to Westernization).
8. See, e.g., Karsten D. Voigt, Bundnistreue als Emanzipation [Alliance as Emancipation],
29 FREITAG, July 16, 1999, http://www.freitag.de/1999/29/06p.htm.
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"indispensable" hegemon,9 into the source of disorder and disaster in
one land after another has its roots in Bush's own illegitimacy, as well as
in our national arrogance and incompetence. I am inclined to trace
much of the energy, aggression, and (ultimately) crimes of this govern-
ment back to the regime's original illegitimacy and its subsequent need
to legitimate itself. Much can be understood about the Bush government
through the lens of Bochum historian Hans Mommsen in his discussions
of the Nazi regime and its leadership. 10 I do not mean to suggest that the
agendas, practices, or goals of the two are the same, or that the crimes,
so far, are of the same order. I will in fact argue that a sincere post-
holocaust, assertive human-rights consciousness, as well as a parallel
hypocritical ideology, are essential to understanding the Bush regime's
policies." But I do mean to suggest that there are some useful and illu-
minating comparisons to be made between the United States' current
government and others with which we are not usually associated.
II. THE BUSH COUP
The coalition that was put together around the pallid, dull, and
almost clownish George W. Bush in 2000 continued the conservative
Republican strategy developed by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. It
9. It should be noted that the description of the United States as the world's "indispensable
nation"-able to see into the future and use force when necessary-was articulated already by
Madeleine Albright in the Clinton years. See Interview by Matt Lauer with Madeleine Albright,
U.S. Sec'y of State, on NBC (Feb. 19, 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/02/
19/98021907_tpo.html. It is not surprising that after the Soviet Union fell and the EU failed to
assert a common and strong military posture, hegemonic thinking in the United States became
irresistible. We cannot know where Clinton foreign policy was headed, particularly after the
failure of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. See Robert Malley & Hussein Agha, Camp David: The
Tragedy of Errors, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 9, 2001, at 59-65, available at http://www.
nybooks.com/articles/14380. Of course, it is possible that Clintonians would have returned to try
again to salve the Middle East's point of combustion or Brennpunkt, in which case much could be
different today. On the other had, it would be foolish to exaggerate Clinton/Democratic readiness
to do all that would be necessary to broker or compel an Israel-Palestine agreement. Still, it was a
first effort. Id.
10. See, e.g., HANS MOMMSEN, FROM WEIMAR TO AUSCHwrz: ESSAYS ON GERMAN HISTORY
1 (Philip O'Connor trans., 1991).
11. Many commentators have remarked on the dramatic presence of Jewish figures in the
Bush administration and among its apologists. See e.g., JACOB HEiLBRUNN, THEY KNEW THEY
WERE RIGHT: THE RISE OF THE NEOCONS (2008); JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER & STEPHEN M. WALT,
THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 5 (2007); Jonathan Freedland, That Is a Racist
Slur: Tam Dalyell's Belief that a Cabal of Neoconservative Jews Controls Bush Is Gaining
Currency in Liberal Circles, GUARDIAN (London), May 7, 2003, at 21; Ori Nir & Ami Eden, Ex-
Mideast Envoy Zinni Charges Neocons Pushed Iraq War To Benefit Israel, JEWISH DAILY
FORWARD, May 28, 2004, http://www.forward.com/articles/5719. Not incorrectly, this presence is
associated with a neoconservative desire to support in the strongest possible way what are
perceived as Israel's interests. But I think one would be gravely mistaken to miss or disregard the
regime's very real, aggressive commitments to protecting human rights and fighting dictatorships,
especially among the regime's intellectual enablers and supporters.
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intended, above all, to dismantle further the welfare state and empower
U.S. elites, while promoting so-called traditional values.1 2 Its strategy
consisted, as it has all along, of economic elites and the media they
control preaching the antigovernment gospel of tax reduction and the
free market; and anti-left, religious self-employed business owners and
white-collar employees or Mittelstdndler in the "new" south and moun-
tain west especially, whose underappreciated belief in God and rugged
individualism are as difficult to understand and deconstruct today as
they were when Alexis de Tocqueville wrote so lavishly about them in
the middle of the nineteenth century.' 3 As to Bush, we should remem-
ber how that other great commentator of the mid-nineteenth century,
Karl Marx, could describe Louis Napoleon as a clown-a farcical recur-
rence of his great uncleln-which, however, didn't prevent the success-
ful coup d'etat of 18th Brumaire. Likewise, George W. was but a
farcical diclassi repeat of his father, only now without a Soviet Union
to encourage caution in the world. In retrospect, seven years after
George W.'s election, it is salutary to recall Mommsen's argument that
Hitler, too, was a weak and unimpressive leader in many respects, often
detached from key decisions both before and after he took office. 5
Unlike 1851, 1922, 1933,16 and other years that witnessed coups
d'6tat or historical transitions of political power, 2000 was not an auspi-
cious year for an opposition victory, let alone a radical change. Despite
the deep sins Bill Clinton had committed against the nation's puritanical
soul, and despite his decision to move the Democratic Party even further
to the right on nearly all domestic issues, he was fortunate to oversee a
period of broad growth and full employment. So, it took something of a
coup d'6tat for Bush to become President.17 Living in Miami, I was able
12. This coalition and its strategies are described, for example, in THOMAS FERGUSON & JOEL
ROGERS, RIGHT TURN: THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS
114-15, 127-30 (1986).
13. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Arthur Goldhanmer
trans., Library of Am. ed. 2004) (1835); see also FERGUSON & ROGERS, supra note 12, at 119-24.
On religion and individualism, see generally THE ROBERT BELLAH READER (Robert N. Bellah &
Steven M. Tipton eds., 2006); INDIVIDUALISM & COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (Robert N.
Bellah et. al. eds., 1988); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-
EDGED SwoRD (1997).
14. KARL MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE 84 (Eden & Cedar Paul
trans., Int'l Publishers 1926) (1853).
15. MOMMSEN, supra note 10, at 185.
16. In 1851, Napoleon unilaterally dissolved the French National Assembly; in 1922, Benito
Mussolini became prime minister of Italy; in 1933, Hitler and the National Socialists came to
power in Germany.
17. Of course, the 2000 election should never even have been close. The failures of the Gore
campaign were many-before and after the vote-but I cannot address them here, beyond
mentioning the fatal error of distancing himself from Clinton. See Ron Fournier, Gore Tries To
Distance Himself from Scandal Bush, CNN.COM, Aug. 11, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/
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to view this coup d'6tat close up as it was prepared and as it unfolded
just a few miles from my office. Like the quasi-coups in Paris of Bru-
maire 1851,8 Rome of March 1922,19 or Berlin of January 1933,20 the
Miami coup combined established conservative/rightist party participa-
tion, both legal and illegal, with radical street terror similar to that used
by Louis Napoleon's Society of December the 10th, Mussolini's
squadristi, Hitler's S.A. storm troopers, and Bush's Cuban-exile
cadres.21
ALLPOLITICS/stories/08/I l/politicsofvalues.ap/index.html. On the other hand, Clinton's failure
to kowtow to the right-wing Miami elite in the Elian Gonzalez affair, though quite in accordance
with the law or rechtsstaatlich, turned out to have disastrous electoral consequences precisely at
the election's "ground zero. " See Dexter Filkins & Dana Canedy, Counting the Vote: Miami-
Dade County; A Mayor, Once Vocal for Gore, Is Silent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2000, at All;
Robert Richie, Letter to the Editor, Elian and the Election, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2000, at A28.
Those consequences could have been negated had Gore chosen the veteran Florida senator (and
later one of the very few outspoken opponents of the Iraq war) Bob Graham as his running mate.
But, looking for someone who had criticized Clinton's behavior, Gore chose instead the Jewish
conservative, Joe Lieberman. Lieberman cost Gore anti-Semitic votes in the South while bringing
absolutely nothing. See Jake Tapper, Too Jewish?, SALON.COM, Aug. 9, 2000, http://archive.
salon.com/politics/feature/2000/08/09/lieberman/print.html. Lieberman has subsequently become
the best proof that appeasement doesn't work. See Adam Clymer, The Nation; Choosing a
Running Mate Matters. Or, Mattered., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2000, § 4, at 4 (noting that Gore's
unexpected choice of Lieberman as a running mate was likely to distance himself from Clinton).
18. See MARX, supra note 14, at 103-26.
19. See ADRIAN LYTTELTON, SEIZURE OF POWER: FASCISM IN ITALY 1919-1929 (3d ed.
2004). For a discussion of the march on Rome, see id. at 77-93.
20. See KARL DIETRICH BRACHER, THE GERMAN DICTATORSHIP: THE ORIGINS, STRUCTURE,
AND EFFECrs OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM 14 (Jean Steinberg trans., 1970).
21. The history of Miami's radical Cuban exiles must be left for another occasion. Suffice it
to say that these terrorists avant la lettre have been harbored and active on the right fringes of the
Republican Party for many years. They played, for example, key roles in the putsch against
Salvador Allende in Chile, Richard Nixon's Watergate, the Reagan Contra war in Nicaragua, and
in other Western Hemisphere mischief that has yet to end. See generally ANN LOUISE BARDACH,
CUBA CONFIDENTIAL: LOVE AND VENGEANCE IN MIAMI AND HAVANA (2002). Of particular
interest in the terrorism context: A quarter-century before September 11, 2001, a Cuban civilian
jetliner in the skies off Barbados plummeted into the ocean, causing all seventy-three people on
board to die in an attack that appeared to have been planned by Cuban Exile, Luis Posada. See
The National Security Archive, Documents Linked to Cuban Exile Luis Posada Highlighted
Targets for Terrorism, http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB218/index.htm (last
visited Nov. 20, 2007). Cuban exiles are always handsomely rewarded, not only with an endless
U.S. campaign against the Castro government, but also with huge financial and ideological
subsidies. Their "legitimate" elite face is also well represented in Washington. John Negroponte
is the former director of National Intelligence, while Cuba-born Otto Reich, with whom he
worked on Nicaragua and Honduras, is in charge of menacing Latin America. Miami's three
Republicans in Congress, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, and son Mario Diaz-Balart,
are among the most reactionary in Washington and completely untouchable in Miami. See, e.g.,
BARDACH, supra, at 306-20; Duncan Campbell, The Bush Dynasty and the Cuban Criminals:
New Book Reveals Links of Two Presidents and the Governor of Florida with Exiled Hardliners,
GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 2, 2002, at 14; Bob Norman, Contra Campaign, MIAMINEWrIMES.COM,
Sept. 23, 2004, http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2004-09-23/news/contra-campaign; Council on
Hemispheric Affairs, Otto Reich: A Career in Disservice, http://www.coha.org/2004/07/13/otto-
reich-a-career-in-disservice (last visited Oct. 12, 2007); New Docs Shed Light on Negroponte's
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To many minds, the December 12, 2000, U.S. Supreme Court rul-
ing that terminated the Florida recount and installed Bush as President
capped an improbable stolen election.22 The Florida voting process was
overseen by the candidate's governor-brother and an elected Florida
interior minister working under him, who simultaneously functioned as
co-chair of the Bush election campaign in Florida. 3 This is true and
reprehensible; yet it undervalues the fascistic moves, or Zige, that pre-
ceded it. These consisted of two major efforts, one culminating on Elec-
tion Day and the other on display during the critical moments of the
recounting process.
First, relying on trustworthy knowledge that almost 90% of former
felons vote Democrat,2 4 and knowing that available racist sentiment
would back them up, Florida Republicans voted to spend $4 million to
purge approximately 8,000 former felons from the voter rolls (including,
as it turned out, 2,883 who were absolutely entitled to vote, having com-
mitted their crimes in previous states of residence where felons were not
disqualified), along with a still-unknown number of false positives dis-
qualified in a deliberately, but not randomly, overbroad search. 25 This
came after Republicans rejected a bill to spend $100,000 for voter edu-
cation.26 These "disqualifications" were first activated and effective on
the day of the 2000 election so that there was no opportunity for
counterchallenge or remedy. 7 So did the southern ancien regime over-
turn the Voting Rights Act,2 8 the jewel of the 1960s civil-rights move-
ment, at least for this occasion. As much as the Weimar period elites
hated popular democracy and universal suffrage,29 I am unaware of any
efforts of this sort in 1932 to keep the wrong people from voting.
Role in Honduras, Iran-Contra Affair, DEMOCRACYNow.ORG, Apr. 13, 2005, http://www.
democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/04/13/1356211&mode=threat&tid=25. See generally DAVID
RIEFF, GOING TO MIAMI: EXILES, TOURISTS, AND REFUGEES IN THE NEW AMERICA (1987).
22. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
23. See Dana Milbank & Jo Becker, Controversy Swirls Around Harris; Florida Secretary of
State Seen as Partisan Figure with Strong Republican Ties, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2000, at A22.
24. See Kenneth P. Vogel, Felons Vote Democratic, National Study Says,
THENEWsTRIBUNE.COM, May 10, 2005, http://dwb.thenewstribune.comlnews/local/story/485029
4p-4452879c.html ("Of Democratic presidential candidates .... Bill Clinton's successful 1996 re-
election campaign would have gotten the highest percentage of felon votes, at 85.4 percent."); see
also Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of
Felony Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 Am. Soc. REv. 777, 792 (2002) (arguing that
Gore would have won the 2000 election if disenfranchised felons in Florida had the right to vote).
25. These matters are recounted in Richard Ray Perez & Joan Sekler's movie,
UNPRECEDENTED: THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (Sony 2002).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (2000).
29. See generally DAVID ABRAHAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC: POLITICAL
ECONOMY AND CRISIS (2d ed. 1986).
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Second, are the truly remarkable but still underappreciated events
in Miami on the 22nd and 23rd of November 2000. After an automatic
machine recount reduced Bush's Florida lead from 1,700 votes to 327
votes,30 the Florida Supreme Court ordered a full recount in several
counties, including Miami-Dade. 3 As the hand recoants showed a defi-
nite trend, with a more than sufficient gain for Gore, the recount in
Miami was shut down and reversed. To read mainstream press accounts
of those days is frightening still, and they underscore what circum-
stances made this President:
After a furious demonstration by Republicans, Miami-Dade County
election officials stunned both sides in the bitter contest for Florida's
presidential vote and decided unanimously today to end their recount
of 654,000 ballots.
The recount began on [November 20, 2000]. By the time it came to
end today, Mr. Gore had gained 157 votes with 99 of 614 precincts
counted.32
The next day we learned some of the particulars of this "furious
demonstration."
The Miami-Dade County Canvassing Board's decision [yesterday] to
shut down its hand recount ... followed a rapid campaign of public
pressure that at least one of the board's three members says helped
persuade him to vote to stop the counting.
The city's most influential Spanish-language radio station, Radio
Mambi, called on staunchly Republican Cuban-Americans to head
downtown to demonstrate. Republican volunteers shouted into
megaphones urging protest. A lawyer for the Republican Party
helped stir ethnic passions by contending that the recount was biased
against Hispanic voters.
The subsequent demonstrations turned violent on Wednesday after
the canvassers had decided to close the recount to the public. Joe
30. See David Firestone & Michael Cooper, Bush Sues To Halt Hand Recount in Florida;
Palm Beach Tally Starts as G.O.P. Cites Risk of Flaws in Process, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000, at
At.
31. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1246 (Fla. 2000), rev'd, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). There
is no question that the Gore campaign, relying on top corporate lawyers, made a fatal political and
ideological error insofar as it demanded a recount only in those counties where it saw potential
gains, rather than in the entire state. See, e.g., Jim Drinkard & Dennis Cauchon, Gore Missed Big
Chance While Chasing Chads, USATODAY.COM, May 11, 2001, http://www.usatoday.com/news/
politics/2001-05-I 0-recountgore.htm.
32. Dana Canedy & Dexter Filkins, Counting the Vote: Miami-Dade County; A Wild Day in
Miami, with an End to Recounting, and Democrats' Going to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2000,
at A31 (internal paragraph divisions omitted).
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Geller, chairman of the Miami-Dade Democratic Party, was escorted
to safety by the police after a crowd chased him down and accused
him of stealing a ballot. Upstairs in the Clark center, several people
were trampled, punched or kicked when protesters tried to rush the
doors outside the office of the Miami-Dade supervisor of
elections....
When the ruckus was over, the protesters had what they had wanted:
a unanimous vote by the board to call off the hand counting.
Republican supporters scoffed at the accusation that they had
engaged in a scheme of intimidation, saying the protest had been
nothing more than a spontaneous manifestation of people's anger.
"It's the same type of democracy in action when Jesse Jackson
parachutes in and starts a protest in the black community," said
Miguel De Grandy, a lawyer for the Republican Party. "People have
a right to express their opinions."
[Radio Mambi reporter Evilio Cepero] played a key role in the pro-
tests, roaming around the building outside ... with a megaphone ....
He regularly cut into Radio Mambi's broadcasts to encourage people
to come downtown. And he also phoned in interviews with two
Republican lawmakers-United States Representatives Lincoln Diaz-
Balart and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, both Cuban-Americans-who also
helped persuade people to come.3 3
III. REICHSTAGSBRAND AND ERMACHTIGUNGSGESETZ-, SEPTEMBER 11
AND THE PATRIOT ACT
Given the enormity of the Nazis' crimes and deviousness, it has
taken a long time to accept the proposition that the Nazis actually did
not themselves torch the Reichstag to create a crisis that would enable
them to eliminate their opponents and tighten their grip on the nation.
The arson of the Reichstag took place more or less as the government
claimed.34 The "genius" of the Nazis, so difficult for rationalists to
accept, lay not primarily in lies and deceptions (though certainly there
33. Dexter Filkins & Dana Canedy, Counting the Vote: Miami-Dade County; Protest
Influenced Miami-Dade's Decision To Stop Recount, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2000, at A4 1.
34. See DIETER DEISEROTH, HERSCH FISCHLER & WOLF-DIETER NARR, NEUES VOM
REICHSTAGSBRAND? EINE DOKUMENTATION: ErN VERSkUMNIS DER DEUTSCHEN
GESCHICHTSSCHrEIBUNG [NEWs ABOUT THE Reichtags Arson? A Documentation: An Omission in
German Historiography] (2004). See generally Hans Mommsen, The Reichstag Fire and Its
Political Consequences, in REPUBLIC TO REICH: THE MAKING OF THE NAZI REvOLtrnON 129-223
(Hajo Holbom ed., Ralph Manheim trans., 1972) (describing the Reichstag fire and its political
consequences).
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were plenty of those), but in being able to exaggerate and transform a
real attack by their enemies and to use it for their own ends. "Sweet are
the uses of adversity / Which like the toad, ugly and venomous, / Wears
yet a precious jewel in his head . . .,,"
With al Qaeda's attacks of September 11 and the more than 3000
deaths they caused, 36 the United States was attacked in the Homeland-
not the furthest reaches of the distant territory of Hawaii as in 1941, but
at its very iconic centers of business and military power, the World
Trade Center in Manhattan and the Pentagon in Washington. This was
almost inconceivable to Americans. In fact, the very word homeland
subsequently had to be rescued from linguistic obscurity.37 (Of course,
the iconic value of the Reichstag, inscribed with its dedication "To the
German People," should not be understated either, and having suffered
recent invasions, the resonance of Heimat to Germans was immediate. 38 )
It was widely-and correctly-remarked at the time that George
W. Bush became President not upon his inauguration in January 2001,
but instead on September 11-or at least whenever he resurfaced from
hiding (until which time it seemed that Mayor Giuliani of New York
was in charge). That was the moment of Bush's Reichstag fire.
Whether one considers Bush a strong and central figure or, following the
Mommsonian analysis (which certainly seems persuasive to anyone with
a vivid recollection of the moment), the product of his supporters, it was
the turning point.39 Unable to become a President by legitimate election,
he now proved able to legitimate the presidency he occupied by building
and fighting a struggle against terrorism, from that day onward and
through the Military Commissions Act of October 2006.4o But not
before: During the summer of 2001, Bush and National Security Advi-
sor, Condoleezza Rice, had ignored an explicit intelligence report warn-
35. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT act 2, sc. 1.
36. Eric Lipton, A New Count of the Dead, But Little Sense of Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
2001, at A41. March 2008 saw the 4000th U.S. military death in Iraq and at least the 300,000th
Iraqi civilian death since the U.S. invasion. See Kim Gamel, Bomb Kills 4 U.S. Soldiers in
Baghdad, Raising Overall U.S. Death Toll in War to 4,000, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 24, 2008,
WL 3/24/08 APWORLD 02:38:25; U.S. Military Deaths in the Conquest of Iraq, http://www.ac.
wwu.edu/-stephan/USfatalities.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2008). One study has reported 600,000
dead civilians. See Lizette Alvarez & Anderw Lehren, 3,000 Deaths in Iraq, Countless Tears at
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at Al (citing Gilbert Burnham et al., Mortality After the 2003
Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample Survey, 368 LANCET 1421 (2006)).
37. See Mickey Kaus, The Trouble with "Homeland": It's a Creepy, Morale-Sapping Word.
Let's Drop It, SLATE, June 14, 2002, http://www.slate.com/?id=2066978.
38. See Michael P. Steinberg, Letter to the Editor, "To the German People," N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2000, at A22.
39. MOMMSEN, supra note 10, at 7.
40. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 10, 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C.).
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ing that al Qaeda was planning an imminent attack against the United
States by crashing hijacked planes into major buildings.41
What followed with astounding rapidity (thirty days) was the USA
PATRIOT Act 42-the U.S. government's version of the Ermdchtigung-
sgesetz, which permitted the German chancellor and his cabinet to enact
laws without parliamentary approval. 43  The German government in
1933 had required twenty-four days, as the senescent President Hinden-
burg was still part of the regime and there was opposition from the
Social Democrats.' 94 of 538 Reichstag deputies (not quite 18%)
opposed the Ermdchtigungsgesetz.45 The PATRIOT Act, though not
nearly so far-reaching (see below), was opposed by 67 legislators (13%),
passing 98-1 in the Senate and 356-66 in the House46 (and renewed and
toughened in 2005). 4 7 Quickly, and whether coincidental or otherwise,
the well-founded panic of September 11 was exacerbated by a mysteri-
ous and never-solved anthrax bio-terrorism panic less than two months
later.48 In Mommsonian fashion, things were just happening, and with
each such development, the underachieving dolt, the perpetually vaca-
tioning mediocrity personified was transformed into a steely commander
in chief. Louis Napoleon the flop might soon don the purple robes of
Emperor Napoleon III.
The constitutional mandate later claimed by Bush for the powers he
41. Although repeatedly denied by Rice, undeniable proof that she received and ignored that
report from July 10, 2001, has become incontrovertible, as former CIA Chief Tenet bails out. See
Phillip Shenon & Mark Mazzetti, Records Confirm C.I.A. Chief Warned Rice on Al Qaeda, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2006, at A 18.
42. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
43. See Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich [Law for Remedying the Distress
of People and Nation], Mar. 24, 1933, RGB1. I S.173, available at http://www.documentarchiv.de/
ns.html; see also Paul H. Haagen, A Hamburg Childhood: The Early Life of Herbert Bernstein, 13
DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 7, 13-14 (2003) (explaining how Hitler "cajoled and bullied the
Reichstag into passing the notorious Enabling Act," which "created the framework for the legal
lawlessness that would characterize the [Nazi] regime"). Both acts have the required Orwellian
full names: "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001" is as deranged as the "Law for Remedying the
Distress of the People and Nation."
44. See BRACHER, supra note 20 at 224-29; Haagen, supra note 43, at 12-14.
45. See Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich [Law for the Remedying of the
Distress of People and Nation], Mar. 23, 1933, RGB1. I at 45, available at http://mdz l.bib-bvb.de/
cocoon/reichsbatt/BlattbsbO0000141,00049.html.
46. See Adam Clymer, Antiterrorism Bill Passes; U.S. Gets Expanded Powers, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2001, at Al.
47. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Passes Legislation To Renew Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2006, at A14; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, House Renews Antiterror Law, But Opposition Builds
in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at Al.
48. See Peter Slevin, For a Country Already on Edge, Added Anxiety; Anthrax Scare
Underscores Vulnerability, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at A8.
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inferred from the PATRIOT Act lay, the administration claimed, in the
President's powers as commander in chief in times of war.49 This was
ratified, according to the President and his ministers, by the robust con-
gressional Authorization for Use of Military Force resolution passed
seven days after September 11. ° In a total of under sixty words, it
authorized the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks...."
Thus was born the War on Terror that has brought us all the terror
of war. The domestic war began promptly with the arrest and secret
detention of over 1200 resident aliens, mostly Muslim. 5 2 Often, deten-
tion was based on civil-immigration violations, but sometimes detention
was based on nothing whatsoever.53 In nearly all cases, detained aliens
were neither charged nor even arraigned. 54  Under a so-called Special
Registration Program, 80,000 young men from two dozen, mostly Mus-
lim, countries were called into the offices of the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service for "voluntary" interviews, photos, and other
procedures.55 For 14,000 of them, the reward for cooperation was
deportation, mostly on technical grounds that had always previously
49. See generally JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005).
50. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541).
51. Id. § 2(a) (emphasis added).
52. America After 9/11: Freedom Preserved or Freedom Lost?: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Muzaffar A. Chishti, Director, Migration
Policy Institute at New York University School of Law) [hereinafter America After 9/11].
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., Matthew Brzezinski, Hady Hassan Omar's Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 50. U.S. immigration law has long required that anyone detained for
deportable immigration violations receive a formal, written Notice to Appear within forty-eight
hours that states the alleged grounds for possible deportation and from which both sides work. 8
C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2007); see also County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991)
(county must provide arrested persons with a determination of probz!ble cause within forty-eight
hours of arrest); Letter from Nat'l & Local Groups, Nat'l Immigration Forum, to Asa Hutchinson,
Undersec'y, Border & Transp. Sec. (Sept. 10, 2004), available at http://immigrationforum.org/
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabid=657. A Homeland Security memorandum instead became the official
charging document. See Memorandum from Asa Hutchinson, Undersec'y, Border & Transp. Sec.,
to Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, on Guidance on
ICE Implementation of Policy and Practice Changes Recommended by the Department of Justice
Inspector Gen. (Mar. 30, 2004). It has been well documented that many post-September I I
immigration detainees were detained for up to six months. See Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV
2307 (JG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39170, at *122 n.36 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
55. These programs and deportations were widely covered in the press. See, e.g., Cam
Simpson & Flynn McRoberts, U.S. Ends Muslim Registry, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2, 2003, at 1;
Migration Policy Institute, DHS May Axe Special Registration of Foreign Visitors, http://
migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.cfm?ID=187 (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
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been ignored.5 6 An unknown number of others were invited for inter-
views by security agencies from which they did not return for extended
periods.57 Another fifty or so individuals were held as "material wit-
nesses" and temporarily disappeared without ever being charged or
called to be witnesses to anything. 58 No one may ever know how many
people were detained or rendered overseas (perhaps for torture by
proxy), where they were held, for how long, or under what circum-
stances. In Feburary 2008, however, the International Red Cross esti-
mated that (excluding those held in Iraq and 390 in Guantdinamo) there
were still over 620 known detainees in Afghanistan and an unknown
number elsewhere.59
In contrast, the Ermdchtigungsgesetz was derived from Hinden-
burg's Reichstagsbrandverordnung, formally the Order "for the Protec-
tion of the People and the Nation" (zum Schutz von Volk und Staat).60  It
too had been a brief declaration: a one-sentence decree issued the day
after the Reichtag arson, restricting habeas corpus, freedom of assembly
and organization, press rights, and the requirements for warrants to
search homes or monitor electronic communications. 6' Under its
authority, about 10,000 people, mostly Communists, were arrested dur-
ing the next two weeks.62 Before long, Nazi military success, economic
recovery, and the cowardice of Germany's enemies made domestic
repression less necessary, at least until the military tide turned. As Her-
mann Goering later explained it while at Nuremberg:
[T]he people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders.
56. Simpson & McRoberts, supra note 55, at 1.
57. See AshI U B5li, Changes in Immigration Law and Practice After September 11: A
Practitioner's Perspective, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 161, 165 (2003).
58. See e.g., America After 9/11, supra note 52; U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 1001 OF THE USA
PATRIOT ACT (2003). On the federal material-witness statute, 18 U.S.C.S. § 3144 (LexisNexis
2007), and its abuse, see generally Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of "Hold Until
Cleared": Reexamining Material Witness Detentions in the Wake of the September l1th Dragnet,
58 VAND. L. REV. 677 (2005) (discussing the illegal detention of "material witnesses"). Perhaps
needless to say, not a single one of these individuals has been convicted of a terrorist crime.
59. International Committee of the Red Cross, US Detention Related to the Events of 11
September 2001 and its Aftermath-the Role of the ICRC, May 31, 2007, available at http://
www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/usa-detention-update- 121205?opendocument. There
were still almost 390 detainees at Guantdnamo in May 2007. Id.; see also Press Release, President
George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions To Try Suspected
Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/print/20
060906-3.html.
60. See, e.g., INTERESSENVERBANDE IN DEUTSCHLAND 70 (Thomas von Winter & Ulrich
Willems eds., 2007).
61. Under Article 48, Section 2 of the Weimar Constitution, Articles 114-118, 123, 124, 153,
could be and were suspended. See WEIMAR CONSTITTION, art. 48, § 2 (providing that civil rights
could be suspended for the sake of public safety).
62. DEBORAH DWORK & ROBERT JAN VAN PELT, HOLOCAUST: A HISTORY 67-68 (2002).
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That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked
and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the
country to danger. It works the same way in any country.6 3
Of course, we Americans have been told that such comparisons,
perhaps phenomenological, can harm the United States and endanger
national unity. It is supposed to mean something different when Bush
declares that "my most important job as your President is to defend the
homeland."' Or as Attorney General, John Ashcroft, rather menacingly
put in while championing the PATRIOT Act in December 2001, "[T]o
those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty[,] my
message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists-for they erode our
national unity and diminish our resolve. ' 6' To rephrase a recent obser-
vation by Claus Offe, the bootstrapping argument of the Bush regime is
the following: "If our government adopts measures of this sort, then just
imagine how acute and ubiquitous the dangers must be that it thereby
protects against" 66-not to mention how necessary and legitimate our
own government must be. Such a government can do whatever it wants
and its leaders ought not to be challenged.
The Bush Ermdchtigung and the legitimation of a presidency never
democratically attained therefore both depend on the construction of a
grave terrorist threat and the need for Ashcroft's and his successors'
unembarrassed repression at home. The result is what Offe describes-
acutely-as an intensified long-term fear of terrorism that accompanies
a "second order" regime terrorism (voiced especially by the vice presi-
dent, secretary of defense, and selected congressional party leaders). 67
Working from the customary description of terrorism allows-again in
Mommsonian fashion-for a regime of self escalation.6" Terrorists use
illegal methods to induce and spread fear and dread in a population in
63. G.M. GILBERT, NUREMBERG DIARY 256 (Signet 1961) (1947). Goering made this
statement to Gilbert, an Allied psychiatrist, during the Easter recess of Goering's trial on April 18,
1946. See id.
64. President George W. Bush, President's Remarks at Victory 2002 Event (Mar. 29, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/O3/20020328.html.
65. DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen.
of the United States).
66. Claus Offe, Rekonstruktion oder Dekonstruktion des "Westens", in SOUVERANITAT,
RECHT, MORAL: DIE GRUNDLAGEN POLITISCHER GEMEINSCHAFT [Reconstruction or
Deconstruction of the "West"?, in SOVEREIGNTY, LAW AND ETHICS: THE FOUNDATION OF
POLITICAL COMMUNITY] 185 (Tine Stein et al. eds., 2007); see also ROBERT E. GOODIN, WHAT'S
WRONG WITH TERRORISM? viii (2006); OLD EUROPE, NEW EUROPE, CORE EUROPE:
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AFrER THE IRAQ WAR (John Torpey et al. eds., 2005).
67. Offe, supra note 66, at 189.
68. See Hans Mommsen, Die Realisierung des Utopischen: Die "Endlosung der Judenfrage"
im "Dritten Reich" [Realization of the Utopian: The "Final Solution of the Jewish Question" in
the "Third Reich"], 9 GESCHICHTE UND GESELLSCHAFr [HIST. & SoC'Y] 381 (1983).
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order to gain political advantage. What the "Bushies" have done is the
following: "(a) at the risk of and sometimes through the very use of
illegal means accomplish (b) the spread of fear and dread throughout the
dramatization of and warnings of terrorism (c) for the purpose of
anchoring and enhancing political power. 6 9 Instead of fear generated
by the brutal acts of "real" terrorists, the empowered regime unhesitat-
ingly escalates "multifaceted and derisive assaults on and suspensions of
civil and human rights way beyond any measure of the requisite, propor-
tionate, or rechtstaatlich."'7
Being the hegemon means that such practices will be contagious
and become accepted by at least some U.S. allies. Being the hegemon
also means that the foreign-policy interests of the United States, as con-
strued and articulated by the self-legitimating regime itself, are perforce
the interests of all so that no other state can or should stop the United
States from pursuing these interests. A long tradition in political theory
accepts the role of the hegemon as the pivot of order and stability.71 Yet
this is, of course, a very dangerous business, as the Berlin legal theorist
Ulrich PreuB has made clear.72 When a power is the protector of the
international constitution, so to speak, the very real danger exists that
"the enemies of the hegemonic state appear to be the enemies of all
humanity .... It could be, then, that the democratic hegemon is not the
answer to the problem of global order but rather perhaps the problem
itself.
73
69. Offe, supra note 66, at 189. The original text reads as follows: "(a) unter und durch
Einsatz rechtwidriger Mittel erzielten (b) Verbreitung von Furcht und Schrecken durch
Dramatisierung des und Warnung vor dem Terrorismus (c) zum Zwecke politischer
Machtsicherung." Id.
70. Id. at 189-90. The original text reads as follows: "Dabei unterscheiden sich regierende
von 'wirklichen' Terroristen vornehmlich durch die Art der rechtswidrigen Mittel, die sie far die
Erzeugung von Furcht einsetzen; im einen Fall sind es brutalste Mordtaten, im anderen die
groffldchige, jeden Mafjstab von Erforderlichkeit, Verhaltnismfiigkeit und Rechtsstaatlichkeit
spottende Verletzung und Suspendierung von Biirger- und Menschenrechten." Id. (emphasis
omitted); see also Eric Lichtblau, Documents Reveal Scope of U.S. Database on Antiwar
Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Cct. 13 2006, at A18 (confirming that the Department of Defense's Talon
database of 1,500 "suspicious incidents" in 2004 and 2005 included dozens of antiwar meetings
and demonstrations as "threats" to security).
71. The literature here is beyond voluminous. See ROBERT GIPIN, THE POLmCAL EcONOMY
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 72-92 (1987); ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD
POLITICS (1981); Robert Gilpin, The Theory of Hegemonic War, in THE ORIGIN AND PREVENTION
OF MAJOR WARS 15 (Robert I. Rotberg & Theodore K. Rabb eds., 1989); see also INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
72. Ulrich K. Preu3, Demokratischer Hegemon und Pariastaaten [Democratic Hegemony
and Pariah States], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, May 9, 2006, at 10.
73. Id. The original text reads as follows: "Seine Feinde, die er als partikularer Staat
natuirlich hat, erscheinen ihm leicht als Feinde der Menschheit... Es konnte also sein, daft ein
demokratischer Hegemon nicht die Ldsung der globalen Ordnungsprobleme der Menschheit ist,
sondern vielmehr selbst ein gravierendes Ordnungsproblem darstellt." Id.
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IV. SOVEREIGN Is HE WHO DECIDES: THE PROTECTOR OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSERVATIVE
ECONOMIC AGENDA74
Enter theorists Carl Schmitt and John Yoo. The defense of such
extraordinary measures lies in the claim that the United States faces an
existential threat. Such an existential threat cannot be managed from
within a conventional constitutional legal framework, it is argued,
because it is simply too dire. Theories of a strong executive and
expanded wartime executive powers are hardly new in the United States,
but they have rarely been pushed so far or so hard.75 What is certain is
that the treatment of enemy combatants and the current issues of torture,
rendition, and disappearances are of a piece with the domestic repression
of the PATRIOT Act.76 The authority given to the President under the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (which was passed against the urg-
ings and protests of Colin Powell and others in the military establish-
ment)77 to define and detain enemy combatants without the benefit of
74. For a discussion of the theory that the sovereign is the person who holds decisionmaking
power in a time of crisis, see CARL SCHMT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans., 1985).
75. For an-overview, see generally THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND
COMPLACENCY (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005). The name most associated with the unitary executive
legal theory underlying both the PATRIOT Act and the famous "Torture Memo," which places
decisions on torture in the hands of the President, is John Yoo. See Memorandum from the U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Office of the Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President,
Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002)
[hereinafter Torture Memo]; JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 182-214 (2005).
76. As is relatively well known by now, the PATRIOT Act, section 215 in particular, extends
to almost every aspect of law enforcement, including obtaining the personal records and tangible
things of nearly anyone without a warrant. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287
(2001) (codified as amended in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1863). Libraries, hospitals, and businesses are
subject to demand letters-"national security letters"-for records and information that are
deemed by the Executive to be "sought for" in terrorism investigations. See id. § 215, 115 Stat. at
287; Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1059 (2006). The institutions and persons in question are prohibited from even
acknowledging that such a demand has been made of them. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2000). Internet
activity is also monitored, along with credit-card billing data. See Donohue, supra, at 1108.
Specific "probable cause" is no longer a prerequisite. Id. at 1095. Incognito detention, initially an
abuse reserved for aliens in trumped-up immigration proceedings after September I1, would
become a permissible part of any terror investigation according to section 201 of the Domestic
Security Enhancement Act of 2003, a.k.a. PATRIOT Act H. See Draft of the Domestic Security
Enhancement Act of 2003, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, § 201 (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.
publicintegrity.org/docs/PatriotAct/story-01_020703_doc l.pdf. See generally DAVID COLE &
JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (The New Press 2006).
77. See Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28
& 42 U.S.C.); Military Commissions Act of 2006 (Opposition), SOURCEWATCH, http://www.
sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=MilitaryCommissions Act of_2006_%28opposition%29 (last
visited Oct. 21, 2007).
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either Geneva Treaty protections or U.S. court review is the outward-
facing aspect of the same power that permits the abridgment of domestic
freedoms.78 Thus, the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force,79
2002 Global War on Terror, 2003 Iraq War, 2004 Torture Memo expli-
cating torture justifications,80 2005 National Security Agency "domestic
spying" revelations8" and warrantless searching bypassing the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act,8 2 and 2006 Military Commissions Act
8 3
are all of a piece. It is at the moment of such emergency-of the excep-
tion-that we find the font of sovereignty and learn who is sovereign.
As is well known, Article 48, paragraph 2, of the Weimar Constitu-
tion read: "In case public safety is seriously threatened or disturbed, the
Reich President may take the measures necessary to reestablish law and
order, if necessary using armed force. In the pursuit of this aim he may
suspend the civil rights described in articles ... partially or entirely. 84
The benign interpretation of this power, at the time and ever since, has
been that democracies must be militant in their own defense against seri-
ous threats and that, therefore, protecting the constitution can sometimes
require suspending or going outside of it. Thus, the guardian of the
constitution-der Huiter der Verfafung-inevitably the Executive, the
President, turns out to be the one who goes outside the constitution.
Still, under this benign theory of the exception, the power to declare the
state of emergency is found in the constitution,85 and so the sovereign
must respect constitutional restraints on the exercise of that power.
Inevitably, however, such restraints prove illusory, and so in the Schmit-
tian version, and perhaps in the incipient U.S. version as well, the sover-
78. Upon the law's signing on October 17, the Justice Department made clear that the
government would move immediately to dismiss more than 500 pending habeas lawsuits. See
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, President Signs New Rules To Prosecute Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
18, 2006, at A20.
79. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541).
80. See Torture Memo, supra note 75; Mike Allen & Dana Priest, Memo on Torture Draws
Focus to Bush, WASH. PosT, June 9, 2004, at A3.
81. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Secretly Lifted Some Limits on
Spying in U.S. After 9/11, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, available at http://www.ny
times.com/2005/12/15/politics/15cnd-program.html; Interview by Amy Goodman,
DEMOCRACYNOW.ORG, with Russell Tice, Former Nat'l Sec. Agency Agent (Jan. 3, 2006), http://
www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/01/03/1435201.
82. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829, 1841-1846,
1861-1862 (2000).
83. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28 &
42 U.S.C.).
84. Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs vom 11. August 1919, art. 48 (Weimar
Constitution).
85. See SCHMITr, supra note 74, at 16-36; see also DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTrrioN
OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 1-59 (2006); DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND
LEGITIMACY: CARL ScimIrr, HANS KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR 1-98 (1997).
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eign comes to operate in a legal black hole, turned perhaps into a gray
hole by broad legislative empowerment or indemnification.
Indeed, in a linguistic twist stranger even than the rediscovery of
"homeland," President Bush has discovered a theory of his extra-legal
virtual self or Eigentlichkeit, namely that he is "The Decider."86 And it
is "The Decider" who is sovereign: On this, Carl Schmitt and John Yoo
agree, as both normalize the exception. The corresponding theoretical
construct has been that of the "unitary executive"-the sovereign is the
one who decides both whether there is an emergency and what to do
about it (Souverin ist wer fiber den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet).
That formula has been accompanied by the suggestion that a constitu-
tional change has occurred.87 Statutes from the 1970s that protected
civil liberties are now declared outmoded, and the war-regulating under-
standings of international law emerging from World War II, Korea, and
Vietnam are declared "quaint" relics.88 Gonzales's position, by the way,
is the same one adopted at Nuremberg by Wilhelm Keitel-where it
helped land him a noose around his neck.89 Going forward, the "unitary
executive" is alleged necessary for fighting an indefinite war on terror-
ism or Islamo-Fascism, a competing moral absolutism: "In America...
the voice of the people is the voice of God,"9 and our own sense of
moral rightness has driven the development of a domestic side to the
86. Many critics have seen this as just another example of Bush's difficulties with the
language, but there is a nonrandomness to his selection: It conflates religious decision-making
authorities (such as talmudic "decisors") with the tie-breaking procedures in racing ("deciders").
In a statement released by President Bush on April 18, 2006, in support of Donald Rumsfeld, Bush
stated, "I hear the voices, and I read the front page, and I know the speculation. But I'm the
decider, and I decide what is best." Ed Henry & Barbara Starr, Bush: 'I'm the Decider' on
Rumsfeld, CNN.coM, Apr. 18, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/18/rumsfeld.
87. One recalls Schmitt's words from the opening pages of his POLITICAL THEOLOGY: "It is
precisely the exception that makes relevant... the whole question of sovereignty.... The most
guidance the constitution can provide is to indicate who can act in such a case." ScHMIrr, supra
note 74, at 6-7; see also OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NI AOLAIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS:
EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 162-70 (2006).
88. James Meek, "Nobody Is Talking," GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 18, 2005, at 2; James
Rowen, Editorial, Confirming Our Worst Fears, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Feb. 7, 2005, at
8A.
89. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, like Attorney General Alberto Gonzales was "The
Decider's" trusted confidant. Upon receiving a memo from General Canaris on the Eastern Front
(when things were going very badly in 1945) that drew attention to the "exceptional arbitrariness
and lawlessness admitted in connection with the Soviet prisoners of war[,]" Keitel wrote in the
report's margins that such quaint concerns of "chivalrous warfare" were unimportant because
"[w]e are dealing here with the destruction of an ideology." 10 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER
1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, at 622-23 (1949); see also EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE
GERMANS 342 (1966).
90. SCHMrIr, supra note 74, at 49.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
commander-in-chief power, and the perception of the U.S. "Homeland"
as a theater of war.
The Bush legal thinkers simply reject the argument, associated with
Dicey9' and the British, but also Kelsen,92 that the sovereign simply has
no authority to suspend the constitution as long as the ordinary courts of
law are open and able to function. 93 A little bit of legality to cover a
"unitary executive's" power grab is arguably worse if, as we have
repeatedly seen since September 11, demi-legality facilitates the seepage
of repression into ever-larger areas of life.94 In the end, congressional
approval of the new Military Commissions Act, for example, amounts to
no more than a formally legal delegation of unchecked authority, a fur-
ther Ermdchtigung, an in-advance indemnification of executive law-
breaking. 95 If "The Decider" continues on this path, then the next step
would be "rule by prerogative" governing certain, ever-expanding
"security" domains while the "rule of law" continued to govern other
areas. That would leave us embarked on what Ernst Fraenkel described
as "The Dual State."
96
Objections to the movement toward a fascistic dual state have been
met at every stage with both governmental and professional incredulity
and outrage. How dare one compare the United States to a dictatorship.
91. See generally ALBERT DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION (8th ed. 1915).
92. HANS KELSEN, 1 GENERAL THEORY OF THE LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg trans.,
1945); HANS KELSEN, NATURAL LAW DOCTRINE AND LEGAL PosrrivIsM (Wolfgang Herbert Kraus
trans., 1945).
93. The American locus classicus for this position is found in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall) 2, 123, 127 (1866), Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 322 (1946), and Home Building
& Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1934). John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino
offer a contrary view, in which they argue that sovereigns everywhere in liberal polities have
prerogative powers, and legislatures will later indemnify their use by the executive or not. John
Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers, 2
INT'L J. CONST. L. 210, 211-21 (2004). Bruce Ackerman would prefer to see legislators rather
than judges regulating emergency powers, and he proposes to accomplish that through a
"supermajoritarian escalator" that demands larger majorities, shorter time frames, and more
checks and balances as the executive raises the stakes. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1031, 1047-49 (2004). David Dyzenhaus's conclusion that
"grey holes are more harmful to the rule of law than black holes" is, I think, correct. David
Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?, 27
CARDozo L. REV. 2005, 2026 (2006).
94. For but a few examples of this seepage, see Brian R. Decker, Comment, "The War of
Information": The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and the
President's Warrantless-Wiretapping Program, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 291, 291-92, 295, 303
(2006).
95. In Dyzenhaus's words: "[T]he legislature will have decided to give the executive what the
Bush administration had claimed it could have without legislative authorization." Dyzenhaus,
supra note 93, at 2039.
96. ERNST FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE: A CONTRImUTION TO THE THEORY OF DICTATORSHIP
3-5, 9-10 (1941).
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The argument goes that perhaps there have been necessary-if-unattrac-
tive measures (Guantdnamo, torture memos, immigrant abuse, warrant-
less searches, and eavesdropping), but these have been in response to
real threats and should not be compared with regimes that have simply
subverted and destroyed the rule of law.97 But neither a Reich nor a
Diktatur is built in a day. Even after enjoying a monopoly of power for
a full year, the Nazi Minister of Justice condemned and even prosecuted
cruelty in the concentration camps.98 Indicting a case of water torture
(!), the Reichsminister wrote:
The nature of the assault, especially the use of water torture, reveals a
brutality and cruelty on the part of the perpetrator that is alien to
German sensibilities and feelings. These cruelties, reminiscent of
oriental sadism, can neither be explained nor excused by even the
most extreme form of hatred in battle.99
As if on cue, however, we saw in the spring of 2007 how the seep-
age of prerogative power into the normal rule-of-law state has advanced.
The exposure of the coordination of institutional powers or Gleichschal-
tung of the Justice Department apparatus at the highest levels has been a
rude awakening. As in some other regimes,' 00 purges violating estab-
lished principles of professional merit are often implemented by young,
religious party zealots-people like Monica Goodling and Kyle Samp-
son, who were promoted ahead of establishment figures.' 0 ' What is
97. Some readers of an earlier version of this piece insisted that it was disrespectful and
wildly exaggerated to compare the trajectory of the Bush administration with dictatorships we
have known. A persistent criticism was that the rule of law inside the United States on non-
terrorism matters remains rock-solid. See, e.g., Posting of Dan Markel to PrawfsBlawg, http://
prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2006/1 1/the rise of bus.html (Nov. 17, 2006, 00:05 EST).
98. "Hatred in battle" was recognized and allowed by the Lieber Code, which was developed
during the U.S. Civil War. FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF
THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD, GENERAL ORDERS No. 100 (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in THE
LAWS OF CONFLICTS (Dietrich Schlinder & Ji0 f Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988); 42 TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14
NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946 (1949); 26 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, at
300-27 (1947) (recounting letters from the Minister of Justice to various subordinates sanctioning
or scolding them for treating prisoners of concentration camps poorly).
99. 42 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946 (1949); 26 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER
1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, at 300-27 (1947).
100. See BRACHER, supra note 20; JOE CONASON, IT CAN HAPPEN HERE: AUTHORITARIAN
PERIL IN THE AGE OF BUSH (2007); FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR. & AzIz Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED
AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR (2007).
101. Monica Goodling was a graduate of Pat Robertson's Regent University Law School and a
product of the religious-populist wing of the Bush bloc, while Kyle Sampson was a representative
of the Rocky Mountain Mormon wing of the Bush bloc. See Alan Cooperman, Bush Loyalist
Rose Quickly at Justice, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2007, at AI5; Charlie Savage, Scandal Puts
Spotlight on Christian Law School: Grads Influential in Justice Dept., BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8,
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peculiarly American is that their appointments, like that of Gonzales
himself, could be heralded as breakthroughs for minorities.10 2 This ille-
gitimate zealotry was on display in the recent Miami Liberty City and
Sears Tower trial, where the government's loudly proclaimed claim to
have disrupted a massive terrorist undertaking was revealed to be a
sham.1 °3 Meanwhile, near-simultaneous release of the Miami-based ter-
rorist Luis Posada Carriles by the same Department of Justice returns us
to the origins of the Bush presidency. 1"
Lest one forget: Along with aggrandized executive sovereignty and
its ramifications, it is worth pointing out that there is an internal, reac-
tionary economic policy that is consistently part of this package. Cor-
ruption and jobbism characterized Marx's and Mommsen's dictators,
and clearly the Bush regime has been characterized by the Halliburton
and Enron scandals, among others. As noted earlier, however, the Bush
economic program, above all, promised to further dismantle the welfare
state' 015 and empower America's elites while promoting so-called tradi-
2007, at Al; Thom Patterson, Key Witness in Attorney Scandal 'Under Attack,' Friends Say,
CNN.coM, Mar. 29, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/03/28/sampson.profile/index.
html. On the purge activists, see Editorial, A Feeble Perfomance, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2007, at
Al; Eric Lipton, Colleagues Cite Partisan Focus by Justice Official, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2007,
at Al.
102. They and their comrades worked for Gonzales, himself a classic crony appointment,
whose naming was heralded, even by those who should have known better, as a breakthrough for
Hispanics and a victory for affirmative action. Michael A. Olivas, Introduction to "COLORED
MEN" AND "HOMBRES AQuf": Hernandez v. Texas and the Emergence of Mexican-American
Lawyering xx (Michael A. Olivas ed., 2006).
103. We will, I predict, soon learn of a new Justice Department repression specialty-turning
loud-mouth fools into terrorists-and the Miami martial-arts conspiracy of Winter 2006 and the
New Jersey pizza-delivery plot and conspiracy will dissolve like the soap bubbles they are. See,
e.g., Paul Thompson & Sarah Baxter, Bizarre Cult of Sears Tower 'Plotter,' SUNDAY TIMES
(London), June 25, 2006; Abby Goodnough, Trial Starts for 7 in Plot To Destroy Sears Tower,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at A14; David Kocieniewski, 6 Men Arrested in a Terror Plot Against
Ft. Dix, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at Al; see also Kirk Semple, U.S. Falters in Terror Case
Against 7 in Miami, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, at A28 ("The outcome was a significant defeat for
the Bush administration, which had described the case as a major crackdown on homegrown
terrorists."). Despite the acquittal of one defendant, a legal permanent-resident immigrant, the
vindictiveness of the regime is used to cover up its own evil: The government is moving to deport
the exonerated defendant on the theory that associating with terrorists is a deportable offense and
that, even though he was acquitted by a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, the defendant
would have lost under a "preponderance" standard, which is all that is necessary for deportability
because it is a civil, not a criminal, issue. See Jay Weaver, Absolved of Terrorism, Haitian Still in
Limbo, MIAMIHERALD.COM, Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/miamidade/story/
405217.htmil.
104. On the Posada affair and his release, see Ann Louise Bardach, Twilight of the Assassins,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2006, at 88, 91-101; Oscar Corral & Alfonso Chardy, Posada Terror
Case: Posada Is with Family but Unable To Comment, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 21, 2007, at B3; see
also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
105. See Gwen Moore et al., Elite Interlocks in Three U.S. Sectors: Nonprofit, Corporate, and
Government, 83 Soc. Sci. Q. 726, 731-32 (2002); Bob Wineburg, Salvation Is No Solution to
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tional values. 10 6 Likewise, although we associate Carl Schmitt with
executive power and sovereignty and the critique of liberal governance,
we should recall that in the early 1930s, Schmitt propagated an eco-
nomic policy very convivial to business and economic elites. Thus, in
his famous 1932 speech to Weimar industrialists, Schmitt spoke of the
"healthy economy in the strong state."'0 7 The demand of Carl Schmitt
and Weimar's business elite, which is now a demand of Bush and
America's business elite, was "to free the economy from the state"-in
other words, to de-state the economy (Entstaatlichung der Wirt-
schaft). 8 In fact, a line can be traced from Schmitt's economic politics,
via Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Karl Popper, and Milton Fried-
man, to the neoliberalism of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and
George W. Bush. Their shared goal has been the end of embedded liber-
alism and the reestablishment, in its place, of favorable conditions for
capital accumulation and the restoration of the power of economic
elites. 0 9 This was, and is, a decidedly antidemocratic demand." 0 Call-
ing for the state to retreat from economic affairs means that the state
should retreat from its social-policy obligations while being politically
authoritarian.1 1' Here, the Bush regime resembles the authoritarian lib-
eralism of Schmitt in 1932 more closely than did the actual Nazi
system. 1 12
America's Social Problems, FORWARD, Mar. 2, 2007, at All, available at http://www.forward.
com/articles/10219.
106. See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 84 (2005) (stating that a
coalition "between elite class and business interests intent on restoring their class power, on the
one hand, and an electoral base among the 'moral majority' . . . now forms the core of the moral
agenda of the neoconservative movement[,]" and that "[w]ithin the [United States] this assertion
of moral values relies heavily on appeals to ideals of nation, religion, history, cultural tradition,
and the like"); see also FERGUSON & ROGERS, supra note 12, at 115-30; HARVEY, supra, at 19
("We can, therefore, interpret neoliberalization ...as a political project to re-establish the
conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites.").
107. Carl Schmitt, Gesunde Wirtschaft im starken Staat [Healthy Economy in the Strong
State], An Address to Business Leaders (Nov. 23, 1932), translated in RENATO CRISTI, CARL
SCHMITT: AUTHORITARIAN LIBERALISM: STRONG STATE AND FREE ECONOMY 212 (1998).
108. Id. Also, for a description and discussion of the Reagan-Bush agenda to de-state the
economy, see FERGUSON & ROGERS, supra note 12, at 124-30.
109. See HARVEY, supra note 106, at 11-22.
110. Id. at 31-38.
111. See Schmitt, supra note 107; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 306-12. For some
industrialists, there was a tension between a healthy economy (gesunde Wirtschaft) and a free
economy (freie Wirtschaft), but most wanted Schmitt's authoritarian liberalism more than they
wanted neo-Manchesterian economics. See generally INGEBORG MAUS, BORGERLICHE
RECHTSTHEORIE UND FASCHISMUS: ZUR SOZIALEN FUNKTION UND AKTUELLEN WIRKUNG DER
THEORIE CARL SCHMII-rS [CIVIC RiGHTs THEORY AND FASCISM: REGARDING THE SOCIAL
FUNCTION AND ONGOING EFFECT OF THE THEORY OF CARL SCHMITT] (1976) (commenting on
Schmitt's current influence over political theory). And one could say that that is true in Bush's
America as well.
112. The later Nazi economy was not at all antistate, but rather highly statist. See, e.g., R.J.
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V. POSTMODERNIST HUMAN-RIGHTS IMPERIALISM: FROM
MILOSEVIC TO SADDAM
I began this analysis by insisting that a sincere post-holocaust,
assertive human-rights consciousness as well as a parallel hypocritical
ideology were both essential to understanding the Bush regime. Permit
me to close by elaborating briefly on this point. Only a few years ago,
one of the leading liberal human-rights figures in the United States,
Samantha Power," 3 argued that holocaust consciousness was extremely
important in politics because it provided "a moral life preserver in a sea
of interest-based callousness.""' 4 From Armenia to Auschwitz, from
the former Yugoslavia to Rwanda, and from Rwanda to Iraq, the cycle
of "interest-based callousness""' 5 has permitted evil forces to destroy
millions of lives. But in the new era of global human-rights conscious-
ness and readiness to intervene, there would be fewer dictators and yet
fewer killers. For the Pinochets, no harbor; for the Milosevics, no quar-
ter; for the Hutu death squads, no looking away; and for the tyrants like
Saddam Hussein, no more toleration, regardless of the oil they might
have to offer the greedy countries of the West.' 16 There would be no
more concessions to tyrants, such as those offered by Donald Rumsfeld
to Saddam Hussein."
7
OVERY, THE NAzi ECONOMIC RECOVERY 1932-1938, at 36-51 (2d ed., 1996); R.J. OVERY, WAR
AND ECONOMY IN THE THIRD REICH 214-15 (1994); ADAM ToozE, THE WAGES OF DESTRUCTION:
THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF THE NAZI ECONOMY 32-33 (2006).
113. Michael Ignatieff and Samantha Power have both argued for an aggressive human-rights
consciousness. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 35-43
(Amy Gutmann ed., 2001); SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE
AGE OF GENOCIDE 503-16 (2002).
114. Samantha Power, To Suffer by Comparison?, 128 DAEDALUS 31, 49 (1999) (emphasis
added).
115. Id.
116. See POWER, supra note 113, at 176, 204, 223 (referencing the extent and worth of the
United States' interest in Iraqi oil, and stating that "the United States was Iraq's primary oil
importer" during the Reagan administration).
117. The National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82 states the following:
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114, dated November 26, 1983 ...
states, "Because of the real and psychological impact of a curtailment in the flow of
oil from the Persian Gulf on the international economic system, we must assure our
readiness to deal promptly with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic." ... Soon
thereafter, Donald Rumsfeld (who had served in various positions in the Nixon and
Ford administrations, including as President Ford's defense secretary, and at this
time headed the multinational pharmaceutical company G.D. Searle & Co.) was
dispatched to the Middle East as a presidential envoy. His December 1983 tour of
regional capitals included Baghdad, where he was to establish "direct contact
between an envoy of President Reagan and President Saddam Hussein," while
emphasizing "his close relationship" with the president. Rumsfeld met with
Saddam, and the two discussed regional issues of mutual interest, shared enmity
toward Iran and Syria, and the U.S.'s efforts to find alternative routes to transport
Iraq's oil; its facilities in the Persian Gulf had been shut down by Iran, and Iran's
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It is perhaps never entirely possible to distinguish among false-
hoods, self-delusions, ideological rationalizations, and utopian hopes.'
1 8
Now, we can only mock the way Bush and his officials went shopping
for war rationales. But it is instructive to look at the most frequently
proffered reasons for supporting war in Iraq offered by U.S. liberals.
Surely, the entirety of the Bush regime or its foreign policy certainly
cannot be reduced to Iraq, but the political and moral vision of the coun-
try's elites and their attitude toward an "axis of evil""' 9 and those who
would fight that axis are, here, on display. Human rights-oriented liber-
als and compassionate conservatives could agree: Saddam was cruel;
120
Saddam had used chemical weapons against both his neighbors and his
own citizens;12 1 Iraqis were suffering from both tyranny and material
sanctions; 12  Iraqis would, like all people everywhere, benefit from
democracy; 123 a democratic Iraq could function as a challenge to repres-
sive Saudi power;2 4 a democratic Iraq could help break the Israeli-Pal-
estinian logjam;12  a democratic, multiethnic, and secular Iraq could
liberalize and help educate the Arab world; 126 a democratic Iraq could
offer idealistic Muslim youth an alternative to symbolic radicalism;
1 27
and a democratic Iraq would represent a place of virtue in international
affairs.
28
ally, Syria, had cut off a pipeline that transported Iraqi oil through its territory.
Rumsfeld made no reference to chemical weapons, according to detailed notes on
the meeting. Rumsfeld also met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, and the two
agreed, "the U.S. and Iraq shared many common interests."... Later, Rumsfeld was
assured by the U.S. interests section that Iraq's leadership had been "extremely
pleased" with the visit, and that "Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way to praise
Rumsfeld as a person[.]"
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK No. 82, SHAKING HANDS WITH
SADDAM HUSSEIN: THE U.S. TILTS TOWARD IRAQ, 1980-1984 (Joyce Battle ed., 2003), http://
www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82 (last visited Oct. 30, 2007) (citations omitted).
118. See generally GEORGE LICHTHEIM, THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS
(1967) (discussing historical logic, ideology, human catastrophe, surivival, and utopia); KARL
MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
(1936).
119. The phrase axis of evil was used by President George W. Bush in his State of the Union
Address on January 29, 2002, in reference to the countries of Iraq, North Korea, and Iran.
President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-1 .html.
120. George Packer, The Liberal Quandary over Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6
(Magazine), at 10.
121. POWER, supra note 113, at 171-79.






128. See Doyle McManus, Iraq Is All but Won; Now What?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at 1
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A merciless focus on the failures of the past and the need to come
to terms with it-Germany's Vergangenheitsbewdltigung-has been a
centerpiece of the general human-rights sensibility.1 29  To use (but
reverse) Max Weber's famous dichotomy, we are to be guided in politics
by an "ethic of ultimate ends" rather than by an "ethic of responsibil-
ity." 130 Human-rights activists agreed that the amoral Bismarckian bal-
ance-of-power Realpolitik endorsed by Weber needed to be superseded
by a higher goal.' Rather than the crass and cold realism that has been
with us since Thucydides' Melian Dialogues, 132 advocating a politics of
states, liberal human-rights advocates urged us first to follow a politics
of people and rights, and to heed the Sermon on the Mount. 133 Among
the varied lessons of the Holocaust, without which none of these tenden-
cies would be imaginable, is that evil must be resisted rather than
accommodated,134 and that sovereignty must yield to international civil
society's sense of justice.' 35 Rather than the convenience of a Yugosla-
via, for example, the legitimate right of self-determination for all peo-
ples (especially for minorities136), including Bosnians, Kosovars, Croats,
Darfurians, Aecheans, and others, must be honored-through force if
necessary. Liberal human-rights enthusiasts often welcomed the "end of
history," which really meant the "end of the Soviet Union,"' 137 because it
opened the door to a free, liberal world order'38 in place of a bipolar
(quoting then Secretary of State Colin Powell as saying that a democratic Iraq would serve as "an
example for the region and to the rest of the world").
129. See generally ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING
HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (2000) (discussing the aftermath of World War II as well as colonialism);
PETER NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE (1999); POLITICS AND THE PAST: ON
REPAIRING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (John Torpey ed., 2003); JOHN TORPEY, MAKING WHOLE
WHAT HAS BEEN SMASHED: ON REPARATIONS POLmCS (2006).
130. FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 120 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds.,
trans., 1946). Weber originally stated that "conduct can be oriented to an 'ethic of ultimate ends'
or to an 'ethic of responsibility.'" Id.
131. See, e.g., MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS 28-29, 52-53 (1985); MICHAEL
IGNATtEP, THE RIGHTs REVOLUTION 2-3, 34-43 (2000) [hereinafter IGNATIEFF, THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION]; DAVID Rmpp, A BED FOR THE NIGHT: HUMANITARIANISM IN CRISIS 268-69, 311
(2002).
132. The Melian Dialogues can be argued to be the original text of international relations
realism. See THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 392-401 (Richard Crawley
trans., 1910).
133. See FROM MAX WEBER, supra note 130, at 119-24.
134. See POWER, supra note 113, at 515-16 (discussing how some protestors in the United
States "believed that 'never again' would the United States allow men and women to be herded
into concentration camps in Europe where they would be starved, raped, and murdered")
(emphasis omitted).
135. See Rmn', supra note 131, at 268-69.
136. See IGNATIEP, THE RIGH-rS REVOLUTION, supra note 131, at 114-24.
137. Karen Bayne, The Fall of the Berlin Wall, TIMES (London), May 19, 2005, at 9.
138. See Jonathan Schell, The Unfinished Twentieth Century; Attempt To Find a Designation
for the 20th Century, HARPER'S MAG., Jan. 1, 2000, at 41.
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world of "interest-based callousness" rationalized as a structure of
security. 3 9
But as we now know, the end of the Soviet Union meant something
altogether different. Rather than, for example, enabling the United
Nations to build on its post-WWII treaties and initiatives and rather than
bringing broadly accepted human-rights norms to bear on all, the world
found itself subjected to a hyper-dominant military and economic power
in the form of the United States. The absence of what U.S. state theo-
rists domestically call "countervailing powers" would soon prove dan-
gerous. 4 ° What liberal human-rights advocates could not know is that
they were helping to prepare the ideological ground for the projection of
the power of the United States by supplying a new liberal imperialist
discourse. What no one could know was that, within a decade or so, that
power would pass into the hands of an aggressive but petty and incom-
petent figure like Bush, surrounded by the basest members of his class.
Together, they would steal an election and then use a vile and depraved,
but nonetheless limited, attack by a tiny group of criminal terrorists14 to
run amok at home and abroad.
The question that remains is whether the Bush regime is a brief,
illegitimate, and repressive episode disturbing an otherwise largely sta-
ble United States Empire, or whether, as with the French Second Empire
139. In the pious world of human-rights advocacy, there is little room for irony or dialectic.
Thus, Lincoln was "too practical" because he did not fight slavery "head on" but fought "only" for
the Union; Franklin Delano Roosevelt was cowardly for fighting Germany rather than ending the
Holocaust; and the Vietnamese surely get no credit for ridding Cambodia of the Khmer Rouge,
since their actual goal was to dominate their neighbor. Ultimate values and transcendent norms
create a new Wilsonianism, a new crusade. See generally JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT
NATIONS? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (2005).
140. After 1990, the Europeans agonized a great deal over their military powerlessness, but the
EU certainly made no moves toward deepening or strengthening any independent power. See,
e.g., John Vinocur, Politicus: At EU, Another Blow to Anti-American Bloc, INT'L HERALD TRIB.
(Paris), June 22, 2004, at 2, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/06/22/politicus ed3 _3.
php; Memorandum from William Kristol to Opinion Leaders (Oct. 8, 1997), available at http://
www.newamericancentury.org/nato-19971008.htm. In fact, the enlargement of the EU through
the accession of the former Communist states was a great victory-that is, it was a great victory
for the United States. In any event, in 2003 the United States outspent the next thirteen countries
put together on defense. Charles V. Pefia, A Reality Check on Military Spending: The United
States Can Fight an Effective War on Terrorism While Still Substantially Cutting Defense
Spending, 21 IssuEs IN Sci. & TECH. 41 (2005). The United States also spent more than the next
ten countries put together on military costs in 2005. Anup Shah, World Military Spending, http://
www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp?p=l (last visited Dec. 18, 2007).
141. Out of the comers and interstices of debate, it becomes increasingly clear that the actual
scope and scale of "terrorism" is far smaller than advertised by the regime. See, e.g., JAMES T.
BENNET-T, HOMELAND SECURITY SCAMS 7, 100, 106 (2006); STEPHEN HOLMES, THE MATADOR'S
CAPE: AMERICA'S RECKLESS RESPONSE TO TERROR (2007); IAN S. LUSTICK, TRAPPED IN THE WAR
ON TERROR 29-47 (2006); JOHN MUELLER, OVERBLOWN: How POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM
INDUSTRY INFLATE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM 29-48 (2006);
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Terrorized by "War on Terror," WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2007, at B I.
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and the German Third Reich, only defeat abroad will topple the leader
and reverse the course of events. But what if there is no power capable
of defeating the American Empire? Is a Vietnam Quagmire, a morass or
two, enough?1 42 What if change must instead await either the recovery
of the American people's own good sense, or the slow erosion of the
specific political economy undergirding its wealth and power.
142. See CHALMERS JOHNSON, NEMESIS (2007).
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